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NOTE
THE JURISPRUDENCE AND JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF
THE COMMENTS TO THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE
Although the Uniform Commercial Code' (the "UCC" or the
"Code") has been one of the most influential statutes of recent time,
and has generated extensive discussion, its "Official Comments" 2
have received almost no scholarly consideration.3 Nearly forty years
of experience has shown that courts defer, and, this discussion will
argue, ought to defer to the guidance the Comments offer as to the
proper application of Code provisions. The Comments occupy an
unusual position as aids to statutory interpretation. They cannot ac-
curately be described as legislative history in the traditional sense,
as there is little evidence that the state legislatures gave any exten-
sive consideration to them when adopting the Code.4 The Com-
ments are not a treatise either, for the drafters clearly intended
them to fulfill a more important role.5 Part I of this Note proposes
that we can only fully understand the proper role of the Comments,
and therefore their authoritative value, in light of the jurisprudence
of the Code.
The importance of the Comments notwithstanding, several fac-
tors may have contributed to confusion and frustration in their ap-
plication. Among these, the effect of the drafting process and
internal inconsistencies of form and purpose play important roles.
Part II of this Note examines these factors as a means of further
understanding why, despite their obvious importance to proper ap-
plication and construction of the Code, the Comments sometimes
fall short of the mark.
Once the proper role of the Comments and the possible rea-
sons for their shortcomings are understood, the question becomes
whether and under what circumstances courts properly should ig-
I Unless otherwise indicated, all references hereinafter to the Uniform Commer-
cial Code are to the 1989 Official Text with Comments.
2 All references hereinafter to the "Comments" or "Official Comments" are to the
"Comments of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and
the American Law Institute."
3 The sole exception is Robert H. Skilton, Some Comments on the Comments to the Uni-
form Commercial Code, 1966 Wis. L. REV. 597.
4 See HONNOLD, SALES AND SALES FINANCING 19 (2d ed. 1962), quoted in Skilton,
supra note 3, at 604.
5 See infra text accompanying notes 34-50.
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nore their guidance. When disputing the Comments' suggested in-
terpretations, courts are apt to derogate the authority of the
Comments as a whole.6 This approach seems both inappropriate as
a matter ofjurisprudence and empirically inaccurate. Part III of this
Note shows that when a court rejects the route suggested in a
comment, the reason in most cases is not that the Comments as a
whole lack sufficient authoritative value; rather, it is because the par-
ticular comment, or the circumstances involved, make application
inappropriate.
I
PURPOSES OF THE COMMENTS
A. Role of the Comments in the Jurisprudence of the Code
Although drafters' comments to a uniform act are by no means
unique to the UCC, the UCC Comments' broad scope and wide-
spread acceptance as authoritative aids to interpretation is unusual.
Earlier attempts at uniform commercial acts by the National Confer-
ence of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws ("NCC") usually
contained only brief commissioner's notes regarding general pur-
pose and policy. 7 Because so many courts relied on Professor Wil-
liston's commentaries on the Uniform Sales Act as "legislative
history," the drafters of the UCC recognized the need for a more
thorough and extensive commentary. 9 Many within the NCC be-
lieved that the subsequent formulation of such legislative histories
by private individuals, even if they participated in drafting the act,
was inappropriate, and that the NCC itself should provide any au-
thoritative legislative background as part of the drafting process.' 0
The mere proposal of extensive comments did not, however, auto-
matically determine their role. Certainly, uniformity was a primary
purpose, but one can only understand the real importance of the
Comments by referring to the jurisprudence of the Code itself.
6 See, e.g., Simmons v. Clemco Indus., 368 So. 2d 509, 514 (Ala. 1979); Miller v.
Preitz, 422 Pa. 383, 393, 221 A.2d 320, 325 (1966).
7 See, e.g., UNIFORM CONDITIONAL SALES ACT (1945); UNIFORM SALES ACT (1941);
and UNIFORM NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW (1924).
8 SAMUEL WILLISTON, SALEs (rev. ed. 1948); SAMUEL WILLISTON, SALES (2d ed.
1924); SAMUEL WILLISTON, SALES (1909).
9 Robert Braucher, The Legislative History of the Uniform Commercial Code, 58 COLUM.
L. REv. 798, 809 (1958).
10 Id.; NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAws, 1944
HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS
149, 164 (1944).
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1. Karl Llewellyn and the Jurisprudence of the Code
While scores of individuals worked on the UCC, 1 a fair under-
standing of the Code and its jurisprudence inevitably requires an
examination of its chief reporter and prime mover, Karl Llewellyn.
Commentators have referred to the UCC as "Karl's Kode"' 2 and
"Lex Llewellyn,"' 3 and, according to the assistant chief reporter,
"[d]espite the numbers of persons involved in the drafting of the
Code, the extent to which it reflects Llewellyn's philosophy of law
and his sense of commercial wisdom and need is startling."' 4 Un-
derstanding the proper role of the Comments within the Code
framework requires a discussion of those aspects of Code jurispru-
dence, as Llewellyn conceived them, which affect the Comments.
a. The UCC as "Semi-Permanent" Legislation.
True to the realist tradition, 15 Llewellyn viewed law as dynamic;
based not on unchangeable rules, but finding its meaning from the
developing customs and traditions of society. 16 He thought of the
Code as "semi-permanent"' 17 in the sense that it would provide a
permanent general framework, but would allow legal rules and com-
mercial business customs to develop within it.18 Llewellyn con-
ceived of "semi-permanency," embodied in a flexible Code, as
particularly appropriate in the commercial setting. As a leading au-
thor on the jurisprudence of the UCC puts it "[c]ommercial law is at
I1 See Braucher, supra note 9; Soia Mentschikoff, The Uniform Commercial Code: An
Experiment in Democracy in Drafting, 36 A.B.AJ. 419 (1950); see also Homer Kripke, The
Principles Underlying the Drafting of the Uniform Commercial Code, 1962 U. ILL. L.F. 321 (1962)
(detailed description of the mechanics of the drafting process).
12 Eugene F. Mooney, Old Kontract Principles and Karl's New Kode: An Essay on the
Jurisprudence of Our New Commercial Law, I1 VILL. L. REV. 213 (1966).
13 Mitchell Franklin, On the Legal Method of the Uniform Commercial Code, 16 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 330, 330 (1951).
14 Soia Mentschikoff, Highlights of the Uniform Commercial Code, 27 MOD. L. REV. 167,
168 n.3 (1964).
15 A detailed treatment of Llewellyn's jurisprudential views and his impact on the
American Realist movement may be found in WILLIAM L. TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN
AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT (1973).
16 Id at 177-79; John L. Gedid, U.C.C. Methodology: Taking a Realistic Look at the Code,.
29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 341, 361-71 (1988). Llewellyn'sjurisprudential views, particu-
larly as they impact on contract law subjects, were spelled out in a number of law review
articles written primarily in the 1930's. Among them are: Karl N. Llewellyn, What Price
Contract?-An Essay in Perspective, 40 YALE LJ. 704 (1931); Karl Llewellyn, The Rule of Law
in Our Case-Law of Contract, 47 YALE LJ. 1243 (1938); Karl N. Llewellyn, Our Case-Law of
Contract: Offer &Acceptance I, 48 YALE L.J. 1 (1938); Karl N. Llewellyn, Our Case-Law of
Contract: Offer &Acceptance II, 48 YALE LJ. 779 (1939). KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COM-
MON LAW TRADrrION (1960) provides a general exposition of Llewellyn's views on the
law.
17 U.C.C. § 1-102 comment 1.
18 See U.C.C. § 1-102(2)(b).
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the margin of public law."' 9  Although the conduct of commercial
transactions affects the public at large, commercial agents, or to use
Code terminology, "merchants, '" 20 largely determine the rules of
commercial relationships in the conduct of their business.2 1 There-
fore, the drafters designed the Code to allow the infusion of these
often informal rules and customs. The Code explicitly provides for
the consideration of trade custom and usage in settling disputes. 22
The drafters based these allowances on a belief that, in the commer-
cial setting, the participants are uniquely situated to determine the
"law" for themselves.23
One of the central themes of Llewellyn's jurisprudence was that
law is "immanent." Statutes and legal rules do not completely lay
out the law; rather, the law inheres in the factual situation before the
court.2 4 A statute drafted thus "does not tell judges the law; it tells
them how to find the law." 25 The result is the generous use of the
often criticized terms26 "reasonable" 27 to describe activity allowed
by the Code, and "unreasonable" 28 to describe actions forbidden by
it. Such language requires a special reliance on the courts' judg-
ment and encourages development within the statutory
framework.2 9
19 Richard Danzig, A Comment on the Jurisprudence of the Uniform Commercial Code, 27
STAN. L. REV. 621, 622 (1975).
20 U.C.C. § 2-104(1).
21 Danzig, supra note 19, at 622-23.
22 See U.C.C. §§ 1-205; 2-202; 2-208.
23 Danzig, supra note 19, at 622-23.
24 See W. TWINING, supra note 15, at 223-26; Danzig, supra note 19, at 624-26;
Gedid, supra note 16, at 363.
25 Danzig, supra note 19, at 626.
26 See, e.g., David Mellinkoff, The Language of the Uniform Commercial Code, 77 YALE LJ.
185, 185-86 (1967).
27 See, e.g., U.C.C. § 1-102(3) (general obligation of reasonableness); § 2-205 (firm
offers held open for a reasonable time); § 2-207(1) (expression of acceptance within a
reasonable time effective as acceptance of offer); § 2-305(1) (open price term means
reasonable price); § 2-609(1) (when reasonable grounds for insecurity arise, party may
suspend performance if commercially reasonable).
28 See, e.g., id. § 1-102(3) (parties may by agreement determine the standards by
which obligations of good faith, diligence, reasonableness, and care are to be measured
so long as those standards are not manifestly unreasonable); § 2-208(2) (express terms
control when construction consistent with usage in trade or course of dealing is unrea-
sonable); § 2-316(1) (exclusion or modification of warranties inoperative if unreasona-
ble in light of express warranties).
29 Danzig, supra note 19, at 625; see also Karl N. Llewellyn, Memorandum to the
Executive Committee on Scope and Program of the NCC Section of Uniform Commer-
cial Acts: Re: Possible Uniform Commercial Code (1940), reprinted in W. TWiNING, supra
note 15, at 524, 526 [hereinafter Llewellyn, Memorandum]. Llewellyn noted the impact
of this philosophy on the drafting of the Code:
Technical language and complex statement cannot be wholly
avoided. But they can be reduced to a minimum. The essential presupposi-
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b. The Code and the Principle of the Patent Reason.
The principle of the patent reason played an important role in
Llewellyn's notion of proper statutory drafting. Essentially, the
principle of the patent reason suggests that the underlying policy of
a statutory provision should be readily recognizable and available so
that provision will always be construed in accordance with it.3O
Although the principle of the patent reason appears to merely state
a truism, that statutes should be interpreted in accordance with their
reasons and policies, the UCC involves a field of law where making
underlying policies explicit is doubly important. The Code is unu-
sual in that it seeks uniformity,3 1 while still requiring liberal inter-
pretation. 32 Although Llewellyn's jurisprudential views involved
heavy reliance on the good faith and good judgment of the courts,
he also realized that judges would need to proceed from a common
point to promote uniformity and to avoid misapplication of the law.
The principle of the patent reason manifests itself in the Code's
statement of general objectives, in statements of policy within indi-
vidual Code provisions, and in the Comments. 33
tion of so reducing them is faith in the courts to give reasonable effect to reasonable
intention of the language.
Semi-permanent Acts must envisage and must encourage development
by the courts.
(1) The first condition of such development is language which is
clear as to direction, but which does not undertake too nicely to mark off
the outer edges of its application. The language of principle, not that of
"rule drawn in derogation," is called for. Language drawn in distrust or
anxiety about courts' understanding may accomplish its immediate pur-
pose, but it paves the way with stumbling blocks within a decade.
Id. (emphasis in original).
30 See W. TWINING, supra note 15, at 321-30; Gedid, supra note 16, at 371-74. Llew-
ellyn described the principle as follows:
Drafting Techniques and Policies
1. Theprinciple of the patent reason: Every provision should show its reason
on its face. Every body of provisions should display on their face their
organizing principle.
The rationale of this is that construction and application are intellec-
tually impossible except with reference to some reason and theory of pur-
pose and organization. Borderline, doubtful, or uncontemplated cases
are inevitable. Reasonably uniform interpretation by judges of different
schooling, learning and skill is tremendously furthered if the reason
which guides application of the same language is the same reason in all
cases. A patent reason, moreover, tremendously decreases the leeway
open to the skillful advocate for persuasive distortion or misapplication
of the language; it requires that any contention, to be successfully persua-
sive, must make some kind of sense in terms of the reason; it provides a real
stimulus toward, though not an assurance of, corrective growth rather
than straitjacketing of the Code by way of case-law.
Karl N. Llewellyn, Karl Llewellyn Papers, § (J) (VI) (i) (e), at 5 (1944), reprinted in W. TWIN-
ING, supra note 15, at 321-22 (emphasis in original) [hereinafter K.L.P.].
31 U.C.C. § 1-102(2)(c).
32 Id § 1-102(1).
33 W. TWINING, supra note 15, at 322.
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2. The Role of the Comments in light of Code Jurisprudence
The drafters recognized the importance of an extensive Code
commentary even before they wrote a word of the Code. Llewellyn
viewed a thorough commentary as vital to effective development of
the "semi-permanent" act.34 In his words: "[A] condition of sound
development by courts is an adequate commentary which guides to
the legal material concerned as a whole. Much of the over-detail of
[the NCC's] Acts have been a device to discount the absence of such
a commentary." 35
The Comments, under this view, do not merely serve as simple
aids to understanding the Code, but are an indispensible part of the
UCC framework. First, given the intentional flexibility built into the
Code, they provide a necessary element of consistency. The draft-
ers designed them to provide a bridge between often confusing or
sparse Code language and the facts of specific cases. Second, based
on the principle of the patent reason, the Comments provide a
ready reference to the policy and purpose of particular provisions
and their relationship to other provisions so as to tie the purposes
and policies of disparate sections together.
Although the Comments have never been mandatory authority,
the drafters initially intended that they carry greater authoritative
weight than they now officially do.3 6 A brief description of the his-
torical treatment of the Comments in the Code text shows that the
absence of any reference to the Comments in the more recent ver-
sions of the Code is primarily formal and does not affect the in-
tended authoritative role of the Comments.
The initial undertaking of the Code project, the first Official
Draft of the Uniform Revised Sales Act ("URSA"), included a spe-
34 See supra text accompanying notes 15-29.
35 Liewellyn, Memorandum, supra note 29, at 526-27 (emphasis in original). Llew-
ellyn explained the need in terms ofjudicial efficiency:
For the fact is that our courts have not the time, in the disposition of
single cases, to fathom the handling of a whole field by a whole uniform
act or code chapter .... The bearing of parts of an Act or Code on one
another and on the whole the courts are willing to see, glad to see; but
counsel do not show that full bearing, and the [NCC] has not undertaken
to show it, either. The [NCC] has instead attempted to make the particu-
lar sections do the work. And that means to cripple the long-range
growth of the Act.
A commentary is thus an integral part of any thought about a Code.
Id at 527.
36 See W. TWINING, supra note 15, at 327-28; Braucher, supra note 9, at 808-09;
Skilton, supra note 3, at 599-600. Much of this discussion centers on the original section
1-102(3)(f) of the 1952 text which provided that "[t]he Comments of the [NCC] and the
American Law Institute may be consulted in the construction and application of this Act
but if text and comment conflict, text controls ...."
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cific reference to the Comments as interpretative aids.3 7 Even
though the Act made reliance on the Comments permissive, the im-
portance of their role was readily apparent. The comment to sec-
tion 1 noted that:
Under Subsection (2) the courts are expressly authorized to con-
sult the Comments in interpreting and applying the principles of
the Act. The Comments thereby acquire a status more than
equivalent to that of a Committee Report on the basis of which a
proposed bill has been enacted by the legislature. .... 38
After this bold beginning, the official status of the Comments
gradually eroded. The initial draft of the UCC contained a section
similar to URSA section 1(2), specifically authorizing courts to con-
sult the Comments.3 9 The attendant comment, however, deleted
any reference to the status of the Comments as legislative history,
emphasizing instead their role as promoters of uniform interpreta-
tion.40 Subsequent drafts and the first official version of UCC sec-
tion 1-102(3)(f) retained the reference to permissive use of the
Comments. 41
The initial version of the UCC met with both widespread enthu-
siasm and widespread resistance. 42 Only Pennsylvania enacted the
1952 version of the Code, and the NCC realized that universal
adoption of the Code was in jeopardy.43 In 1953 the New York
State Legislature submitted the Code to the State Law Revision
Commission to determine whether New York should adopt it.4 4
The impact of the Law Revision Commission study and recommen-
dations cannot be overstated, as adoption by New York was to pro-
vide the impetus for widespread acceptance of the Code.45 The Law
37 UNIFORM REVISED SALES ACT (1940 Official Draft) § (1)(2), which provided:
(2) The Official Joint Comments of the National Conference of Com-
missioners on Uniform State Laws and the American Law Institute may
be consulted by the courts to determine the underlying reasons, purposes
and policies of this Act and may be used as a guide in its construction and
application.
38 Id. § (1) comment 1 (emphasis added).
39 U.C.C. § 1-102(2) (May 1949 Draft).
The Official Comments of the National Conference of Commission-
ers on Uniform State Laws and the American Law Institute may be con-
sulted by the courts to determine the underlying reasons, purposes and
policies of this Act and may be used as a guide in its construction and
application.
40 Id. § 1-102 comment 3.
41 See U.C.C. § 1-102(3)(f) Proposed Final Draft No. 2 (Spring 1951); U.C.C. § 1-
102(3)(f) (1952 Official Draft).
42 Braucher, supra note 9, at 801-02.
43 See id. at 802-03.
44 Id.
45 JAMES J. WHrrE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 11 (3d ed.
1988); Braucher, supra note 9, at 803-04.
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Revision Commission explictly questioned whether the inclusion of
the specific reference to the Comments contained in section 1-
102(3) (f) was proper statutory drafting practice. 46 The Commission
regarded the problem as one of "legislative technique," and be-
lieved that the reference to extrinsic materials in aid of interpreta-
tion was unconventional and unnecessary. 47 The Commission
noted that courts had referred to similar commentaries to other uni-
form acts as part of a "general legislative history," and that they
would probably.do so with those of the UCC.48
The 1957 version of the UCC did not contain section 1-
102(3)(f). 49 Notwithstanding the Law Revision Commission's mis-
givings, the Editorial Board stated that the reason for the deletion
was "because the old Comments were clearly out of date and it was
not known when new ones could be prepared .... -50 Despite sub-
sequent revision of both the Code and Comments, no code section
specifically referring to the Comments as interpretive aids has been
readopted.
This brief exposition of the Comments as they relate to the ju-
risprudence of the Code shows that the form and nature of the Code
require that the Comments be considered an important part of the
overall Code framework, and thus entitled to considerable authori-
tative weight. In addition, the history of the treatment of Comments
in the text of the Code itself shows that the absence of any reference
to the Comments in the text of the present Code does not vitiate
their importance. Initial inclusion indicates that the drafters consid-
ered the role of the Comments important and the exclusion of refer-
ence to them primarily a matter of form.
B. The Goal of Uniformity and the Comments
As reflected in the title to the Code and its general statement of
purpose, a central goal of the UCC is uniformity.5' The scope of the
Code project, however, often contributed to ambiguities in the text
of the Code and doubts as to its proper application. Because expe-
rience with earlier uniform acts demonstrated that the courts could
quickly emasculate even the most valiant efforts at uniformity
through non-uniform interpretation, 52 the drafters frequently relied
on the Comments to clarify intent and promote uniform
46 2 N.Y. State Law Revision Comm'n Report 30-37 (1955).
47 Id at 32, 37.
48 Id. at 37.
49 U.C.C., 1957 Official Text with Comments (1958).
50 1956 RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE UNIFORM COMMER-
CIAL CODE 3 (1957) [hereinafter 1956 RECOMMENDATIONS].
51 See U.C.C. § 1-102(2)(c).
52 J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 45, at 3; Gedid, supra note 16, at 344-46.
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interpretation.5 3
The nature of the Code further highlights the purpose of the
Comments as aids to uniform construction. In Llewellyn's words,
the Code is drafted in "the language of principle";5 4 the Code pro-
vides a framework of general principles upon which the commercial
community, and more particularly the courts, should build. In light
of the intentional flexibility of the Code text and the heavy reliance
on judicial construction, 55 the Comments serve as indispensible aids
to uniform construction and development.
C. The Comments as a Lawyer's Aid
The simplification of then-existing commercial law was among
the central reasons for the creation of the UCC.5 6 The perceived
woeful state of knowledge of commercial law and commercial prac-
tices of the bar at large greatly concerned the drafters. 57 They
blamed much of this ignorance on the complexity of commercial law
as it developed in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,
and on the failure of the law to adapt to modern commercial prac-
tices. 58 Even when lawyers knew the law, they were apt to under-
stand it only as abstract theory with little relation to actual
commercial practice. 59 The drafters envisioned the UCC as a flexi-
ble statute which would adapt to changing commercial practices,
and a simplified, unified source of commercial law which the average
lawyer could understand. 60
The drafters designed the Comments to aid the bar in two ways.
First, the Comments would act as a road map to direct the lawyer
through the Code by relating sections to one another and by explic-
53 The comment to section 1-102 of the 1952 version of the Code states in part:
Uniformity throughout American jurisdictions is one of the main
objectives of this Code; and that objective cannot be obtained without
substantial uniformity of construction. To aid in uniform construction
these Comments . . . set forth the purpose of various provisions of this
Act, thus disclosing the uniform intent of the lawmaking bodies in enact-
ing the Code. Therefore, subsection 3(f) of the present section recom-
mends these Comments to... the courts to promote uniformity ....
See also Maurice H. Merrill, Uniformly Correct Construction of Uniform Laws, 49 A.B.A. J. 545,
546 (1963) (developing role of comments to clarify intent).
54 Llewellyn, Memorandum, supra note 29, at 526.
55 See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
56 U.C.C. § 1-102(2)(a).
57 Karl N. Llewellyn, Statement to the New York State Law Revision Commission:
A Simple Case on Behalf of the Code, reprinted in W. TWINING, supra note 15, at 530, 536-
37 [hereinafter, Llewellyn, Statement].
58 See generally Karl N. Llewellyn, Why We Need the Uniform Commercial Code, 10 U. FLA.
L. REv. 367 (1957).
59 Id. at 373.
60 Llewellyn, Memorandum, supra note 29, at 525.
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itly delineating the policies promoted by particular sections.6 1 Sec-
ond, they would show the relation of the law to commercial practice.
By making commercial law more understandable and therefore
more accessible to lawyers, it would become more accessible to the
larger business community. 62
Even a leading critic of the Comments stated that "[s]tudy of
the comments is indispensible to a knowledge of the Code."'63 In
fact, nearly four decades of experience has shown that judges, law-
yers, and law students gain a significant part of their understanding
of the Code from the Comments. While reliance by the legal com-
munity does not of itself make the Comments authoritative, the
Comments do provide a common frame of reference and under-
standing of the Code, a factor which should not be ignored when
considering their authority.
II
PROBLEM SOURCES
Despite its importance to the development of commercial law
and its significant improvement upon pre-existing law, the UCC and
the Comments are by no means perfect. This section outlines sev-
eral factors which may have contributed to confusion and impreci-
sion in the Code and more particulary in the Comments. The
Comments' lack of authority in certain instances often stems from
these problems.
Above all, one must remember that "the comments are the
work of human beings-gifted human beings, to be sure, but still
human beings." 64 The drafting and revision process itself is a
source of inconsistency. The scope and scale of the UCC project,
along with differences in approach and agenda among the partici-
pants and the difficult and ongoing process of revision, all have con-
tributed to confusion in the Code. 65 As for the Comments
themselves, inconsistency in form and purpose often lead to confu-
sion in application. 66
A. The Effect of the Drafting and Revision Process
Designed to replace seven then-existing uniform acts, 67 the
61 Karl N. Llewellyn, Why a Commercial Code, 22 TENN. L. REv. 779, 782 (1953).
62 Id at 782-83; Llewellyn, Memorandum, supra note 29, at 525; Llewellyn, State-
ment, supra note 57, at 536.
63 Skilton, supra note 3, at 631.
64 Id
65 See infra notes 67-85 and accompanying text.
66 See infra notes 86-88 and accompanying text.
67 These acts were:
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UCC project is of a scope unmatched in American law making.
Over 1000 lawyers and business people participated in drafting the
initial version of the Code.68 The UCC covers a broad area of law.
Although its central concern is with the "movement of goods, the
payment therefor, and the financing thereof,"69 the Code also deals
with investment securities, 70 bank deposits and collections, 71 and
more recently the leasing of goods. 72 The Code thus provides a
large and fertile field for the growth of confusion and ambiguity.
Only the adoption of the Code in most if not all American juris-
dictions could achieve the goal of uniformity. 73 The drafters, there-
fore, sought throughout the process to write a document that would
be widely acceptable. Such concerns led to consideration of the
often conflicting interests of bankers and merchants, legal scholars,
practicing attorneys, and state legislatures. 74 Satisfying the interests
of such diverse groups required compromise which could not help
but infuse unclarity and confusion into the drafting process. Aside
from these competing interests, there was an inherent conflict be-
tween those who actually drafted the Code and their parent
organizations. 75
Both the American Law Institute (the "ALI") in their Restate-
ment projects and the NCC in its numerous uniform acts created
relatively conservative products. 76 The law professors who actually
wrote the initial drafts of the Code text and Comments, however,
Last Number of
Uniform Act Promulgated Enacted States
Negotiable Instruments Law 1896 1924 48
Uniform Sales Act 1906 1941 34
Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act 1906 1945 48
Uniform Stock Transfer Act 1909 1947 48
Uniform Bills of Lading Act 1909 1947 31
Uniform Conditional Sales Act 1918 1945 10
Uniform Trust Receipts Act 1933 1955 32
Adapted from Braucher, supra note 9, at 799.
68 Llewellyn, Memorandum, supra note 29, at 528 (emphasis in original). See gener-
ally 1 New York States Law Revision Comm'n Report 8 (1955); Braucher, supra note 9, at
799; Mentschikoff, supra note 14, at 167.
69 Mentschikoff, supra note 11, at.
70 U.C.C. Article 8.
71 U.C.C. Article 4.
72 U.C.C. Article 2A.
73 See supra notes 51-55 and accompanying text.
74 Kripke, supra note 11, at 327.
75 The Code project was initiated by the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws (NCC), but they later invited the American Law Institute (ALI) to
participate in the project. Thereafter, the drafting process was largely modeled on the
ALI method developed in preparing the Restatements. See Braucher, supra note 9, at 800.
For a detailed description of the organization of the drafting process, see W. TWINING,
supra note 15, at 278-85.
76 Kripke, supra note 11, at 326-28.
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were much more willing to adopt fundamental changes in the law
than were the members of the sponsoring organizations. 7 7
Although usually held in abeyance by either the drafting staff itself
or by the Code's subsequent editors, some of these iconoclastic ten-
dencies still appear in the Code.78 The Comments provided a ready
vehicle to smooth over such differences and promote compromise, a
factor which can occasionally result in seeming conflicts between the
text and the Comments. 79
The ongoing revision of the Code also contributes to conflict
between the Code text and the Comments. In the 1950's, the
Code's proponents continuously altered the text and Comments to
satisfy the sponsoring organizations, the ABA, and numerous state
legislatures.8 0 Since 1961, the Permanent Editorial Board (PEB) has
continuously reviewed the Code for potential changes and
improvements.8 1
The most striking example of this revision process remains the
work of the New York State Law Revision Commission which recom-
mended changes to almost every aspect of the Code.8 2 Approxi-
mately ninety percent of these recommendations were incorporated
in the 1957 version of the Code.85 Between the earliest discussion
of the Code in 1940 and the 1957 Official Text and Comments, the
Code underwent innumerable changes, and has since undergone
numerous revisions.8 4 The effect of this constant revision on the
compatibility of the Comments with the Code text cannot be clearly
demonstrated, but the recommendations for the 1956 version noted
that the Comments were out of date,8 5 showing that, at least in that
instance, the revision process affected the compatibility of Code and
Comments. Although the NCC subsequently has revised the Com-
77 Id. at 322-23.
78 Id. at 322-26.
79 J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 45, at 13.
80 Braucher, supra note 9, at 801-04.
81 J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 45, at 5. More recently, however, some com-
mentators have accused the PEB of acting more as a force of inertia than of change. See
Mellinkoff, supra note 26, at 224-25.
82 See generally N.Y. State Law Revision Comm'n Report (1956); 1-3 N.Y. State Law
Revision Comm'n Report (1955); 1-2 N.Y. State Law Revision Comm'n Report (1954);
see also supra text accompanying notes 45-48.
83 NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS IN UNIFORM STATE LAWS, 1957 HAND-
BOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS 100-01
(1957), reprinted in W. TWINING, supra note 15, at 296.
84 Major revisions were made in 1962, 1972, 1977, 1987 (with the inclusion of Arti-
cle 2A - Leases) 1989, (with the recommended repeal of Article 6 - Bulk Sales), and
Articles 3 and 4 are currently undergoing revision, and Article 4A dealing with elec-
tronic funds transfers is being considered. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 45, at 10,
20.
85 1956 RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 50, at 3; see also notes 44-50 and accompany-
ing text (developing other objections of New York to the comments).
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ments, the process of revision is obviously fraught with opportuni-
ties for confusion and inaccuracy.
B. Inconsistency in Comment Form and Substance
Each section of the Code has a comment, and outwardly all of
the Comments to the UCC share the same format.8 6 Despite this
outward consistency, the content of any individual comment will not
necessarily match or even resemble another in terms of actual pur-
pose. In the only extensive treatment of the Comments as a whole,
Robert Skilton describes the functional character of individual com-
ments as:
(1) expository-seeking to describe the meaning and application
of a section of the Code and its relationship with other sections,
(2) gap-filling-seeking to suggest answers to questions not pre-
cisely covered by the text, or (3) promotional and argumenta-
tive-seeking to "sell" a controversial section. . . . The
classifications are not mutually exclusive.8 7
This inconsistency in purpose creates additional difficulties in apply-
ing the Comments to specific problems arising under the Code.
Ideally, the Comments should provide "straight exposition[s] of
purpose and effect of [each] section and its relation to the prior law
and other portions of the Act." 88 As a comment strays from this
ideal in form and purpose, its authority is undermined. Although a
comment's gap-filling suggestion may provide the appropriate solu-
tion to a novel problem, the Comments retain their greatest author-
ity when they focus on the exposition of the purposes and policies of
the Code.
III
JUDICIAL DISREGARD OF THE COMMENTS
Although authority often is neatly compartmentalized as either
primary or secondary, a more appropriate and functional concep-
tion is one which views authority as existing on a continuum, with
constitutions and statutes occupying a position at one end, and con-
tinuing to scholarly works and even social custom at the other. To
say that the Comments are not the Code says no more than that
their authority differs from that of a statute. Proper consideration of
the Comment's authoritative value should begin with a recognition
86 K.L.P., supra note 30, § (J)(V)(2)(d)(i) (1943), reprinted in W.TwiNING, supra note
15, at 327.
87 Skilton, supra note 3, at 608.
88 K.L.P., supra note 30, § (J)(V)(2)(d)(i) (1943), reprinted in W. TWINING, supra note
15, at 327.
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of the Comments' inherent authority as derived from their role in
Code jurisprudence.
In the great majority of cases, courts cite the Comments to sup-
port the application or purpose described in them.8 9 In some cases,
however, courts specifically reject the Comments as authority for
their propositions. This section discusses several cases where courts
have rejected the Comments and shows how aspects of the dispute
involved or specific deficiencies in the particular comment, rather
than a lack of authoritativeness of the Comments as a whole, under-
mine that particular comment's authority.
A. Rulemaking: Comments Acting as Code
In a few instances, the Comments prescribe requirements that
are so specific that they overstep their proper role as interpretive
guides. In these instances, the Comments go beyond explication or
gap-filling, and take on a rulemaking character which their role in
the Code framework does not justify. Although some courts may
adopt the solution provided in such comments, comments that stray
into areas more properly left to the Code text generally lose some of
their authoritative value. The comments to sections 2-507 and 2-
702 illustrate two specific examples of this rulemaking tendency.
1. Cash Sale Reclamation Waiver: Section 2-507
Section 2-507(2) conditions a buyer's rights as against a seller
on payment for delivered goods or documents of title.90 The sec-
tion is mute, however, on the question of when the seller has waived
his right to reclaim the goods for failure to pay.91 Despite this si-
lence, comment 3 to the section suggests that a ten day limit on
reclamation applicable to credit sales92 should apply to cash sales as
89 See, e.g., International Minerals & Chem. Corp. v. Liano, Inc., 770 F.2d 879 (10th
Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1015 (1986); Contrail Leasing Partners, Ltd. v. Consoli-
dated Airways, Inc., 742 F.2d 1095 (7th Cir. 1984); United States v. Squires, 378 F.
Supp. 798 (S.D. Iowa 1974); ABM Escrow Closing & Consulting, Inc. v. Matanuska
Maid, Inc., 659 P.2d 1170 (Alaska 1983); Citicorp Person-to-Person Financial Center,
Inc. v. Fremont Nat'l Bank, 738 P.2d 29 (Colo. Ct. App. 1987); New England Merchants
Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Old Colony Trust Co., 11 Mass. App. Ct. 539, 417 N.E.2d 471
(1981); Newman Grove Creamery Co. v. Deaver, 208 Neb. 178, 302 N.W.2d 697 (1981);
Village Motors, Inc. v. American Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n, 231 Va. 408, 345 S.E.2d
288 (1986).
90 "Where payment is due and demanded on the delivery to the buyer of goods or
documents of tide, his right as against the seller to retain or dispose of them is condi-
tional upon his making the payment due." U.C.C. § 2-507(2).
91 Id.
92 "Where the seller discovers that the buyer has received goods on credit while
insolvent he may reclaim the goods upon demand made within ten days after the receipt
.... " Id. § 2-702(2).
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well.93 This problem occurs most often in the case of a dishonored
check.
In Burk v Emmick, 94 the buyer paid for 950 steers, in part with a
sight draft which the bank subsequently dishonored. The seller
then reclaimed the cattle and sold them for less than the contract
price. 95 The buyer raised the defense that the seller waived his right
to reclaim the goods when he failed to reclaim the goods within ten
days of receipt as suggested in comment 3 to section 2-507.96 The
comment reads in part:
Should the seller after making such a conditional delivery fail to
follow up his rights [i.e., reclaim the goods], the condition is
waived. The provision of this Article for a ten day limit within
which the seller may reclaim goods delivered on credit to an insol-
vent buyer is also applicable here.97
The court rejected the comment and instead applied a test of rea-
sonableness, emphasizing the issue of prejudice to the buyer.98 The
comment could not "impose restrictions unwarranted by the statu-
tory language." 99 Clearly, the suggestion of this case is that the ten
day restriction is so specific that it should properly be contained in
the Code. In this instance, the comment is neither explicative nor
gap-filling, but rulemaking, a role wholly outside its proper func-
tion. In the absence of a specific restriction on the exercise of reme-
dial rights, courts will, and probably should, retain the flexibility
necessary to achieve equitable results. 00
2. Exception to the Ten Day Reclamation Right: Section 2-702(2)
An additional, but perhaps less striking, example of the Com-
ments acting as Code may be seen in comment 2 to section 2-702.
As noted in the preceding discussion, a seller's right to reclaim
goods sold on credit is good only for ten days after the buyer's re-
ceipt of the goods. 10 1 This limitation does not apply, however, "if
misrepresentation of solvency has been made to the particular seller
in writing within three months before delivery."' 0 2 Although gener-
ally explicative, comment 2 contains an additional requirement that
93 Id. § 2-507 comment 3. But see Citizens Bank of Roseville v. Taggart, 143 Cal.
App. 3d 318, 191 Cal. Rptr. 729 (1983) (declining to apply Comment 3 to § 2-507).
94 637 F.2d 1172 (8th Cir. 1980).
95 Burk, 637 F.2d at 1173.
96 Id. at 1175.
97 U.C.C. § 2-507 comment 3.
98 Burk, 637 F.2d at 1176.
99 Id. at 1175 n.5.
100 See U.C.C. § 1-106(2) ("Any right or obligation declared by this Act is enforcea-
ble by action unless the provision declaring it specifies a different and limited effect.").
10 U.C.C. § 2-702(2). See supra note 92 for language.
102 Id.
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the written misrepresentation also be dated within the same three
month period. 10 3
In the bankruptcy case of In re Bel Aire Carpets,t0 4 a seller re-
ceived a written misrepresentation of solvency within the prescribed
three month period, but the document was dated thirteen months
prior to the transaction. The trustee in bankruptcy sought to void
the reclamation and characterize it as a post-bankruptcy transaction,
relying on the "dated" requirement contained in the comment. 10 5
In upholding the reclamation under section 2-702, the court
centered on the prevention of fraud as the policy basis for the mis-
representation excuse. The central issue was whether the seller's
reliance on the misrepresentation was reasonable under the circum-
stances, not whether a specific technical requirement had been
met. 106 The Code text requires some care on the part of the seller
by requiring a writing and imposing the three month limit. An addi-
tional specific requirement of care on the part of the seller would,
given the underlying policy of preventing fraud, be more appropri-
ately contained in the Code text.
One cannot always easily determine whether a particular com-
ment imposes an additional rule-like requirement or merely clarifies
the requirements of the Code text. In light of the preceeding exam-
ples, however, at least one characteristic may be identified which can
assist the interpreter. When a comment includes specific technical
requirements as opposed to general policy guidance, this may be
some indication of the "rulemaking" error.
The inclusion of such specific rulemaking language provides
perhaps the clearest example of overstepping by the Comments.
The Comments derive their authority from their role in the Code
structure. In those instances when they go beyond explanation of
purpose and general gap-filling and cross into the territory of the
Code itself, they undermine that authority. Additionally, by engag-
ing in a rulemaking function, the Comments may even run afoul of
some of the most basic principles and policies of the Code, includ-
ing the mandate of liberal interpretation and the requirement of lib-
eral administration of remedies.
103 "To fall within the exception the statement of solvency must be in writing, ad-
dressed to the particular seller and dated within three months of the delivery." Id. § 2-
702 comment 2 (emphasis added).
104 452 F.2d 1210 (9th Cir. 1971).
105 Id. at 1211-12.
106 Idt at 1212-13.
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B. External Inconsistency: Comments in Conflict with
Independently Developed Policies
A problem arises when the comment to a particular Code sec-
tion outlines policies or makes gap-filling suggestions which come
into conflict with other independent policies. The UCC is extensive
and cannot help but intersect with many areas of the law. This over-
lap may result in external inconsistency where the policies of the
Code, as outlined in the Comments, conflict with policies which de-
veloped independent of the Code and which manifest themselves in
other statutes, judicial policies, or as non-uniform amendments to
the Code itself. Section 2-607's breach of warranty notification re-
quirement, section 4-207's damages provision, and section 9-107's
definition of a purchase money security interest provide examples of
this problem.
1. Section 2-607"s Breach of Warranty Notification Requirement as
Applied to Third-Party Warranty Beneficiaries
Section 2-607(3)(a) requires a buyer to notify his seller of any
breach of warranty within a reasonable time or be barred from any
remedy. 10 7 Section 2-318 extends warranty coverage to non-buyer
third parties for personal injuries resulting from breach of war-
ranty.108 A central issue is whether courts should apply the reason-
able time notification requirement imposed explicitly on buyers to
third-party beneficiary claimants as well.
Any breach of warranty action brought by a buyer under the
UCC includes a reasonable time notification inquiry. 109 The rea-
sons for the reasonable time notification requirement are: 1) to al-
low the seller an opportunity to make adjustment, cure defects and
generally mitigate damages; 2) to enable the seller to prepare suffi-
ciently for negotiation or litigation (e.g., assemble evidence and pre-
vent changes in circumstances); and 3) to allow the seller peace of
mind. 10
Comment 5 to section 2-607 suggests that the drafters of the
Code believed that at least some of the above reasons applied to
third-party warranty beneficiaries as well as buyers. That comment
states:
107 "Where tender has been accepted ... (a) the buyer must within a reasonable
time after he discovers or should have discovered any breach notify the seller of breach
or be barred from any remedy .. " U.C.C. § 2-607(3)(a).
108 See infra notes 146-54 for a more complete explanation.
109 See U.C.C. § 2-607(3)(a). Although comment 4 to section 2-607 recognizes that a
longer period may be appropriate when the buyer is a consumer, the reasonable time
inquiry still remains.
110 j. WHrrE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 45, at 481.
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Such a beneficiary does not fall within the reason of the present
section in regard to discovery of defects and the giving of notice
within a reasonable time after acceptance, since he has nothing to
do with acceptance. However, the reason of this section does extend to
requiring the beneficiary to notify the seller that an injury has occurred.
What is said above, with regard to the extended time for reason-
able notification from the lay consumer after the injury is also ap-
plicable here; but even a beneficiary can be properly held to the
use of good faith in notifying, once he has had time to become
aware of the legal situation."1 '
The comment thus recognizes that the difference between a buyer's
obligation and a third-party beneficiary's obligation to notify the
seller of a breach of warranty parallels their different roles in the
transaction. The policy basis for notification differs only as to war-
ranty breaches discoverable at acceptance or shortly thereafter. The
comment recognizes no difference as to warranty breaches which re-
sult in injury.
Based on the principle of liberal construction in accordance
with purpose," 2 a reasonable construction of the buyer notification
requirement could include third-party warranty beneficiaries. While
some commentators have supported comment 5's argument that the
policies underlying the section apply to third-party beneficiaries as
well as buyers,"13 courts consistently have held to the contrary." 14
They usually justify ignoring the comment's suggestion in terms of
proper statutory construction: if the statute meant to include both
buyers and third-party beneficiaries it would have said so.115 A
more principled explanation of judicial disregard of the comment's
suggestion is that extrinsic and independent policy considerations
require a narrower reading.
Among the cases that reject the comment is Simmons v. Clemco
Industries.116 Although the court adopted the standard statutory in-
terpretation argument," 7 the case is unusual in that it explicitly dis-
cusses a collateral policy which militates against application of the
comment. Clemco Industries involved an action by several workers for
111 U.C.C. § 2-607 comment 5 (emphasis added).
112 U.C.C. § 1-102(1).
113 See, e.g., . Phillips, Notice of Breach in Sales and Strict Tort Liability Law, 47 IND. L.J.
457, 463-64 (1972).
114 See Taylor v. American Honda Motor Co., 555 F. Supp. 59 (M.D. Fla. 1982);
Tomczuk v. Town of Cheshire, 26 Conn. Supp. 219, 217 A.2d 71 (1965); Chaffin v.
Atlanta Coca Cola Bottling Co., 127 Ga. App. 619, 194 S.E.2d 513 (1972); Frericks v.
General Motors Corp., 278 Md. 304, 363 A.2d 460 (1976).
115 See, e.g., Frericks, 278 Md. at 312, 363 A.2d at 464 (quoting Wright v. Bank of
California Nat'l Ass'n, 276 Cal. App. 2d 485, 490, 81 Cal. Rptr. 11, 14 (1969)) ("[T]he
plain language of the statute cannot be varied by reference to the comments.").
116 368 So. 2d 509 (Ala. 1979).117 Id. at 513-14.
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personal injuries caused by defective sandblasting hoods. 118 De-
fendants sought to convince a federal court that the plaintiffs failed
to provide notice of the breach within a reasonable time. In answer-
ing a series of certified questions regarding Alabama law, the Ala-
bama Supreme Court held that despite comment 5's suggestion, the
reasonable time requirement imposed on buyers did not extend to
third-party warranty beneficiaries. 19
The court particularly noted that Alabama had adopted several
non-uniform amendments to the UCC which indicated "an intent to
expand the right of recovery for personal injury arising from a
breach of warranty."' 120 These changes included a prohibition on
warranty limitation and waiver clauses for personal injuries in the
case of consumer goods, 12 1 the adoption of the more liberal Alter-
native 2 of section 2-318 abolishing the privity requirement for per-
sonal injury claims, 122 and a provision clearly stating that the statute
of limitations tolls from the date of the injury and not from the date
of the sale. 123
Although the court ultimately justified its decision by reference
to a plain meaning rule and discounted the authority of the Com-
ments as a whole, 124 the case demonstrates how independently de-
veloped state policies can conflict with and affect the authority of the
Comments.
2. Section 4-207: Attorney Fees as Awardable Expenses
Some cases applying the comment to section 4-207 provide ex-
amples of conflict between the suggestions of the Comments and
judicial policy. Section 4-207 deals with presentment warranties
and engagements to honor.125 Under section 4-207(3),126 damages
for breach of such warranties or engagements include consideration
paid, finance charges, and related expenses. The comments to the
section state that "[t]he 'expenses' referred to in this phrase may be
118 Id. at 511.
119 Id. at 513-14.
120 Id. at 514.
121 Ala. Code § 7-2-316(5) (1972).
122 Id. § 7-2-318 (1972); see infra notes 146-49 and accompanying text.
123 Id § 7-2-725(2) (1972).
124 Simmons, 368 So. 2d at 513-14.
125 Generally, this is a warranty by a depositor to a collecting bank and by both to
subsequent collecting banks that a check has not been materially altered or does not
bear forged endorsements. For a full discussion, seeJ. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note
45, at 678-86.
126 Section 4-207(3) provides that "[diamages for breach of such warranties or en-
gagements to honor shall not exceed the consideration received by the customer or
collecting bank responsible plus finance charges and expenses related to the item, if
any."
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ordinary collection expenses and in appropriate cases could also in-
clude such expenses as attorneys fees."' 27 Although some courts
have allowed attorneys fees as damages, 28 the suggestion that a
court may award attorneys fees as damages in some circumstances
has not met with universal acceptance.
In Riedel v. First National Bank of Oregon,129 the Oregon Supreme
Court gave a typical response to this suggestion, stating in part:
Given the historical antipathy of this court to awarding attorney
fees in the absence of express authority and legislative presumed
awareness thereof we find it reasonable to conclude that had the
legislature of this state meant that attorney fees could be awarded
... , it would not have left that authority to be found only in the
Commissioners' Comment. 130
It seems puzzling indeed, given the general conservative tenor of
the Code project,13 ' that the drafters would suggest that a court
could in some circumstances award attorney fees, a traditionally dis-
favored concept in the American system.' 3 2 Nevertheless, this com-
ment provides a striking example of the Comments at loggerheads
with a substantial independently developed judicial policy.
3. Section 9-107 and the "Transformation Rule"
Article 9 of the Code dealing with secured transactions often
intersects with bankruptcy law. Under the Bankruptcy Code, 3 3 a
debtor may avoid creditor's liens on certain consumer goods if they
are not purchase money security interests.13 4 A problem arises
when the debtor refinances with the same creditor using the same
collateral. Such refinancing usually involves restructuring the debt
to allow for an extended repayment schedule, and is often compli-
127 U.C.C. § 4-207 comment 5.
128 E.g., Perkins State Bank v. Connolly, 632 F.2d 1306, 1315 (5th Cir. 1980); Bagby
v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 491 F.2d 192 (8th Cir. 1974).
129 287 Or. 285, 598 P.2d 302 (1979).
130 Id. at 291, 598 P.2d at 305.
131 See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
132 For a discussion of the policy implications of attorney fee shifting, see generally
Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., The Legal Theory of Allorney Fee Shifting: A Critical Overview, 1982
Dumn LJ. 651 (1982).
133 142 Title 11, U.S.C., Bankruptcy, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978) (codi-
fied at 11 U.S.C. §§ 1-1330).
134 11 U.S.C. § 522(f). A security interest is a "purchase money security interest" to
the extent that it is
(a) taken or retained by the seller of the collateral to secure all or part of
its price; or
(b) taken by a person who by making advances or incurring an obligation
gives value to enable the debtor to acquire rights in or the use of collat-
eral if such value is in fact so used.
U.C.C. § 9-107.
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cated by the inclusion of small cash advances beyond that owed on
the original purchase money debt. 135 The issue becomes whether
the refinancing "transforms" the purchase money security interest
into a non-purchase money security interest. 136
Comment 2 to section 9-107 states in part:
This section therefore provides that the purchase money party
must be one who gives value "by making advances or incurring an
obligation": the quoted language excludes from the purchase money
category any security interest taken as security for or in satisfaction of a
preexisting claim or antecedent debt. 137
Some courts applying a literal reading of the comment have taken
the position that refinancing results in a transformation of the
purchase money debt into a non-purchase money debt.138
In rejecting this interpretation of the comment, some courts
have emphasized that the "transformation rule" undermines some
basic policies underlying bankruptcy law. Applying the transforma-
tion rule discourages purchase money creditors from helping trou-
bled debtors to restructure their debt and avoid bankruptcy all
together. 39 Additionally, the rule does not comport with the rea-
son for the exemption for non-purchase money debt, which is to
protect consumer debtors from general creditors who might seek to
improve their position in a bankruptcy situation by attaching secur-
ity interests to household possessions. 140
A strict reading of the solution suggested in Comment 2 to sec-
tion 9-107 comports with some aspects of Code policy, such as sim-
plification' 4' and the general disposition to protect consumers in
credit transactions. 142 However, such a reading conflicts with other
independent policies of bankruptcy law and tends to undermine the
comment's authoritative value, especially in the bankruptcy context.
These instances where the Comments conflict with other in-
135 See, e.g., In re Billings, 838 F.2d 405, 406 (10th Cir. 1988).
136 Mary Aronov, The Transformation Rule Applied to Purchase Money Security Interests in
Commercial Transactions, 16 MEM. ST. U.L. REv. 15 (1985);, The Overloaded PMSI in Bank-
ruptcy: A Problem in Search of Resolution, 60 TEMP. L.Q. 1 (1987); Note, The Transformation
Rule Under Section 522 of the Bankruptcy Code of 1978, 84 MICH. L. REv. 109 (1985) (au-
thored by Raymond B. Check); Note, Preserving the Purchase Money Status of Refinanced or
Commingled Purchase Money Debt, 35 STAN. L. REv. 1133 (1983) (authored by Bernard A.
Bark).
137 U.C.C. § 9-107 comment 2 (emphasis added).
138 See, e.g., Dominion Bank of The Cumberlands v. Nuckolls, 780 F.2d 408 (4th Cir.
1985); In re Matthews, 724 F.2d 798 (9th Cir. 1984).
139 Billings, 838 F.2d at 409.
140 Id. at 410.
141 U.C.C. § 1-102(2)(a).
142 See, e.g., id. § 9-204(2) restricting security interests in after acquired property in
the case of consumer goods. For a discussion of "strong against the weak" provisions in
the Code, see also Kripke, supra note 11, at 323-24.
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dependent policy considerations are less a fault in the Comments
themselves and more the inevitable result of the vast scope of the
UCC.143 As the examples discussed show, Code provisions may
touch on aspects of tort law, 144 damages, civil procedure, 145 and
bankruptcy. 146 In so doing, the Code and the Comments may stray
into unanticipated, and therefore unplanned-for contingencies.
This results, as perhaps it should, in courts disregarding comment
suggestions which conflict with other important policy
considerations.
C. A Comment Inviting Expansion: Comment 3 to Section 2-
318
Section 2-318 extends the benefits of implied and express war-
ranties of merchantability and fitness for ordinary use beyond the
buyer to third parties. The section is written in three alternatives,
each with progressively broader application. 147 Alternative A ex-
tends warranty coverage for personal injuries to members of the
buyer's family and guests. 148 Alternative B extends coverage for
personal injuries to any person who may reasonably be expected to
use, consume or be affected by the goods.149 Alternative C is sub-
stantially the same as Alternative B, except that it extends coverage
to any injury whether to person or property. 150
The initial draft of the Code included only Alternative A. 151 In
1966, the section was amended to add the other alternatives in rec-
ognition of common law tort developments. 152 The Comments
143 See supra notes 67-72 and accompanying text.
144 See supra notes 107-24 and accompanying text.
145 See supra notes 125-32 and accompanying text.
146 See supra notes 133-42 and accompanying text.
147 U.C.C. § 2-318.
148 Alternative A
A seller's warranty... extends to any natural person who is in the
family or household of his buyer or who is a guest in his home if it is
reasonable to expect that such person may use, consume or be affected
by the goods and who is injured in person by breach of the warranty.
Id
149 Alternative B
A seller's warranty... extends to any natural person who may rea-
sonably be expected to use, consume or be affected by the goods and who
is injured in person by breach of the warranty.
Id.
150 Alternative C
A seller's warranty... extends to any person who may reasonably be
expected to use, consume or be affected by the goods and who is injured
by breach of the warranty.
Id
151 U.C.C. § 2-318 (1952).
152 U.C.G. § 2-318 (1966).
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were also amended at this time. Comment 3 to section 2-318 now
states that Alternative A, in spite of its apparent limitation on third-
party beneficiaries, "is neutral and is not intended to enlarge or re-
strict the developing case law on whether the seller's warranties,
given to his buyer who resells, extend to other persons in the dis-
tributive chain."' 53 Thus, the comment suggests that the Code does
not intend to restrict the courts from further rolling back the privity
requirement despite the clear statutory prescription. Despite the
comment's interpretation of Alternative A, many courts feel that
"[s]ince the advent of the U.C.C., commercial sales law is statutory.
We have no precedent for changing statutory law by court decision
"154
Comment 3 to section 2-318 shows how the purpose of a com-
ment can influence its authoritative value. The comment seeks not
to explain the policy of the Code provision, but to promote a partic-
ular view of the law. In this case, it appears that, although the 1966
revision retained the original alternative of section 2-318, it sought
to encourage development toward the more liberal formulations.
By straying from an expository role to a promotional role, the com-
ment thus undermines its own authority.
D. The Internally Inconsistent Comment
The simplest way to ensure that courts will not accept a com-
ment as authority is to apply it without reference to the Code. Occa-
sionally, perhaps as a result of the infirmities in the drafting process
itself,155 a comment sneaks in which is basically inconsistent with
Code language or policy. Comment 2 to section 2-326 illustrates
such a problem.
Section 2-326 deals with the rights of creditors and consignors
in consigned goods.156 Section 2-326(2) contains a general rule that
consigned goods are subject to the rights of "creditors" while in the
consignee's possession. 157 A consignor may avoid this result if,
among other things, she complies with the filing provisions of Arti-
cle 9.158 Section 9-114 outlines the steps necessary to have priority
over prior secured parties in the consigned goods. 159 Comment 2
153 U.C.C. § 2-318 comment 3.
154 Williams v. Fulmer, 695 S.W.2d 411, 414 (Ky. 1985); accord Miller v. Preitz, 422
Pa. 383, 221 A.2d 320 (1966).
155 See supra notes 67-85 and accompanying text.
156 U.C.C. § 2-326.
157 Id. § 2-326(2).
158 Section 2-326(3)(c) makes goods delivered on consignment subject to prior cred-
itors' claims except when he "complies with the filing provisions of the Article on Se-
cured Transactions (Article 9)". Id. § 2-326(2).
159 These requirements are filing before the consignee receives possession of the
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to section 2-326 explains that "subsection (3) resolves all reason-
able doubts as to the nature of the transaction in favor of the general
creditors of the buyer." 160 The comment correctly notes that subsec-
tion 3 serves to protect general creditors. However, the Code text
seeks to resolve disputes between consignors and "creditors," a
term which would include both general and secured creditors. 61
Additionally, both the subsection itself, by allowing the consignor to
protect herself by filing, 162 and Article 9 provisions dealing with fil-
ing for consignments,' 63 suggest that the section is applicable to se-
cured creditors as well as general creditors.
Inconsistencies, such as the one just described, result more
from incompleteness than from outright contradiction. The Com-
ments often deal with ambiguous situations. However, when a read-
ing of the Comments renders an interpretation absurd in light of the
Code text, they cannot be considered authority for that position. As
the example of section 2-326 shows, the saving grace of. such in-
consistent comments is that when read in light of the entire Code
structure their shortcomings become readily evident, and their ap-
plication can be limited accordingly.
CONCLUSION
For a variety of reasons, courts seem compelled to minimize the
authority of the Comments almost every time they refer to them.
The incantation that the Comments "were not enacted by the...
legislature" 164 ill serves those seeking to determine their authorita-
tive value. The truth of the matter is that the Comments are authori-
tative. To say that legislatures did not enact them says nothing
more than that their authority is not the same as a statute's. Legisla-
tures do not enact common law rules and precedent, yet they have
authoritative value. Because the Comments are an unusual source
of legal authority which do not fit neatly into any pre-defined cate-
gory, the nature of their authority is often overlooked.
The Comments derive their authority not only from their char-
acter as largely contemporaneous notations of the drafters of the
Code itself, but more importantly from their role in the jurispru-
dence of the Code. Like any authority, however, the Comments are
subject to infirmities, many of which are unique to it. Often these
goods and providing within five years of delivery written notification, which states that
the consignor expects to deliver goods on consignment and describes the goods to prior
secured parties.
160 U.C.C. § 2-326 comment 2 (emphasis added).
161 Id. § 1-201(12).
162 Id. § 2-326(3)(c).
163 Id. § 9-114.
164 Miller v. Preitz, 422 Pa. 383, 393, 221 A.2d 320, 325 (1966).
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infirmities contribute to situations in which the Comments are not
and probably should not be authoritative. What the judicial treat-
ment of the Comments lacks is a recognition of their authority, an
identification of its sources, and an appropriate consideration of
their weight in light of their limitations in given contexts.
Sean Michael Hannaway
